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Humans, animals and computers: Minding 
machines?
¿Humanos, animales y computadores: máquinas pensantes?
Edward A. Wasserman1
Abstract
are there minding machines? In this paper, I consult historical, philosoph-
ical, and empirical materials in trying to answer this intriguing question. 
My historical and philosophical discussions focus on five famous French-
men (Michele de Montaigne, René Descartes, Salomon de Caus, Julien 
offray de la Mettrie, and Jacques Vaucanson) and one famous american 
(William James). My review of empirical research focuses on four topics in 
contemporary comparative cognition: associative/causal learning, short-
term memory, number discrimination, and metacognition. I conclude 
that minding machines do exist; they are humans and animals. Minding 
may be said to mediate the complex changes in behavior that humans and 
animals exhibit. However, computers and other mechanical devices are 
pale replicas that are built from the “wrong stuff.” They will never attain 
the status of minding machines.
Key words: comparative cognition, associative/causal learning, short-
term memory, number discrimination, metacognition.
Resumen
¿Hay máquinas pensantes? en este artículo consulto material histórico, 
filosófico y empírico, tratando de responder esta intrigante pregunta. Mi 
discusión histórica y filosófica revisa el pensamiento de cinco famosos 
franceses (Michele de Montaigne, René Descartes, Salomon de Caus, Ju-
lien offray de la Mettrie y Jacques Vaucanson) y de un famoso america-
no (William James). Mi revisión de investigaciones empíricas se focaliza 
en cuatro temas contemporáneos en cognición comparada: aprendizaje 
asociativo/causal, memoria de corto plazo, discriminación numérica, y 
metacognición. Concluyo que existen máquinas pensantes, ellas son los 
humanos y los animales. el acto de pensar, podría ser dicho, media los 
complejos cambios en el comportamiento que muestran humanos y ani-
males. Sin embargo, computadores y otros dispositivos mecánicos son 
pálidas réplicas que están construidas con “el material equivocado”. Nun-
ca lograrán el estatus de máquinas pensantes. 
Palabras clave: cognición comparada, aprendizaje asociativo/causal, 
memoria de corto plazo, discriminación numérica, metacognición.
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In the New York Times of November 11, 2003, the 25 most 
provocative questions facing science were enumerated. Three of them are 
of special importance to psychological science. Number 4: How does the 
brain work? Number 14: Can robots become conscious? and, Number 16. 
are animals smarter than we think?
In the present paper, I will touch upon these three key questions 
while considering one overarching query: are there minding machines? 
In attempting to answer this question, I will broadly interpret the terms 
“minding” and “machine” in my discussion of minding in humans, animals, 
and computers (for more on the excesses of mentalistic interpretation, see 
Wasserman & Zentall, 2006a).
I appreciate the daunting subject of this paper. So, I will consult 
historical, philosophical, and empirical materials in trying to shed light 
on the nature of “minding machines.” My historical and philosophical 
discussions will focus on five famous Frenchmen (Michele de Montaigne, 
René Descartes, Salomon de Caus, Julien offray de la Mettrie, and 
Jacques Vaucanson) and one famous american (William James). and, my 
review of empirical research will focus on four especially interesting topics 
in contemporary comparative cognition: associative/causal learning, short-
term memory, number discrimination, and metacognition. Following 
these discussions and reviews, I will offer a few observations and analyses.
Historical and philosophical discussion
before considering any experimental evidence, it may be helpful 
to provide some perspectives in the history of behavioral science and the 
philosophy of mind. So, let me now move to those notable individuals 
whose work will inform our later discussion.
Montaigne
Michele de Montaigne (1533-1592) was a Renaissance essayist. 
although Montaigne was originally schooled as a lawyer, the character of 
his writings has led to his being known as a philosopher or a “skeptical 
thinker”. The work that is most pertinent to us here is his famous Apologie 
de Raymond Sebond (1580/2003), in which he critically considered the 
relationship between humans and animals.
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of humans, Montaigne wrote that presumption is our natural 
and original infirmity. of all of earth’s many creatures, we are the most 
miserable and frail; yet, we are also the most arrogant. That arrogance leads 
us to ascribe divine attributes to ourselves and to separate ourselves from 
all other creatures.
Montaigne raised penetrating questions about this arrogant 
placement of humans apart from and above animals. Is it really so easy 
to say with certainty what sets humans apart from animals? and, by what 
comparison between them and us do we ascribe brutishness only to them? 
Montaigne believed that skeptical inquiry into animal behavior can answer 
these two profound questions (Silver, 2002).
Montaigne’s own skeptical inquiry into animal behavior dealt 
mainly with what he found in ancient texts, which suggested that animals: 
communicate socially, exhibit some forms of craftsmanship, and display 
some signs of logical decision making. In evaluating the dichotomy 
between animals versus humans, Montaigne adopted the following rule: 
From like results we must infer like faculties. This logic prompted Montaigne 
to conclude that human communication and reasoning cannot be firmly 
distinguished from animals’ perhaps less advanced abilities (gunderson, 
1964). Thus, humans and animals must obey the same laws of nature, 
leading to the humbling position that there is no special place for humans 
among all of nature’s creatures (Melehy, 2005; Silver, 2002).
Descartes and Caus
René Descartes (1596-1650) offered a dramatically different view 
of humans and animals. of course, Descartes was the most celebrated 
French philosopher. He was also a mathematician and an anatomist. and, 
he famously espoused the philosophical doctrine of mind-body dualism.
In order to properly appreciate Descartes’ position on mind and 
body, we have to expand our consideration to: humans, animals, and 
machines. Machines played a particularly prominent part in shaping 
Descartes’ views.
as did many others of his time, Descartes visited several famous 
gardens in europe. one of these gardens was in Saint-germain-en-laye, 
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only 12 miles from Paris. There, amazing automatons (self-operating 
machines) were featured. Many of these marvelous devices were fabricated 
by Salomon de Caus.
Caus (1576-1626) was an engineer, who designed hydraulic 
automata for the grottoes in Saint-germain-en-laye and in many 
other european venues. Those hydraulic automata were the source of 
considerable fame and fortune for designers like Caus. These designers 
carefully concealed the designs of their machines; to have revealed these 
secrets would have deprived the spectators of their sense of wonder and 
denied the designers their lucrative livelihoods.
Descartes was especially fascinated by these hydraulic machines. 
but, beyond this fascination, Descartes saw real scientific possibilities for 
understanding the design of these machines. So, he sought to reveal the 
secret workings of these human creations; and, he later deployed the same 
investigative methods to divulge the secret workings of nature’s creations.
Focusing on the operating properties of machines in his Discours 
de la méthode: Météores (1637/adam & tannery, 1908), Descartes focused 
his talents and energies on the rainbow fountain: a notable wonder of the 
Renaissance garden in which a fine mist of water was sprayed skyward to 
catch the sunlight and to produce a rainbow on demand. This machine was 
to serve as a test case for Descartes’ scientific method, which he deployed 
in order to understand the workings of the rainbow fountain through 
experiment and mathematics (Werrett, 2001).
That test proved to be highly successful. It was so successful that 
divulging the workings of this artificial device actually led to Descartes’ ex-
plaining natural rainbows, thus prompting his conviction that all rainbows 
—whether natural or artificial— were produced by the same mechanical 
principles involving the reflection and refraction of light. Descartes thus 
concluded that all of nature may be a glorious machine —vastly more 
complex and on a far grander scale than any human contrivance.
Descartes discussed the nature of humans in his famous Traité de 
l’homme (1632/1972). There, he proposed that humans too are machines. 
but, we are vastly more intricate than hydraulic automata. Unlike 
machines, humans are capable of thought and language. Critically, we 
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have an immaterial “rational soul,” existing outside of the body and only 
influencing bodily movement via the pineal gland.
Descartes discussed the nature of animals in his famous Letter to 
the Marquess of Newcastle (1646/ariew, 2000). There, Descartes argued 
that animals are purely beastly mechanisms —bête-machines (gunderson, 
1964; Newman, 2001). animals do have sensations and passions; but, 
these are merely organic reactions. animals lack thought and language. 
animals lack abstraction and metacognition (Smith, 2005). and, animals 
have no mind or “rational soul” (avramides, 1996).
Contrasting animals versus machines, Descartes contended that 
animals are mindless bodies like machines. So, he put animals into the 
category of automata and insisted that they behave mechanically —just 
like clocks (erion, 2001). Contrasting animals versus humans, Descartes 
conceded that humans and animals are both organic machines. but, 
he argued that humans are special. We also have language and reason, 
whereas animals do not. Reason —what Descartes also called the universal 
instrument (Wilson, 1995)— allows humans to respond flexibly to any 
and all conditions as well as to attain mastery over nature (Melehy, 2005).
La Mettrie and Vaucanson
Julien offray de la Mettrie (1709-1751) was a physician and a 
philosopher. His materialist ideas were at odds with the prevailing religious 
notions that were foundational to Descartes’ dualism. la Mettrie too 
had interesting and important things to say about humans, animals, and 
machines.
la Mettrie agreed with Descartes that animals were machines. 
He also agreed with Descartes that animals had no souls. but, la Mettrie 
pursued Descartes’ idea of the bête-machine to its logical end: l’homme 
machine (1747/1996). Daringly, la Mettrie believed that humans too are 
machines which also had no souls.
What did la Mettrie see as the relationship among humans, 
animals, and machines? Humans do not essentially differ from animals. 
Humans and animals are highly complex machines, whose matter and 
organization produce: life, feelings, intelligence, and consciousness 
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(gunderson, 1964; Vartanian, 1993). la Mettrie believed that nature 
created these biological machines with even more elaborate art than 
Jacques Vaucanson crafted his automatons.
Jacques Vaucanson? yes, another engineer was to have a signifi-
cant influence on psychological science!
Vaucanson (1709-1783) was an engineer who turned the mecha-
nistic ideas of la Mettrie and Descartes into technical reality (Wood, 2002). 
Vaucanson set out to create what he called a moving anatomy —anatomie 
mouvante. The automata that he constructed have been considered to repre-
sent philosophical experiments (Riskin, 2003b) which sought to answer two 
intriguing questions. Which aspects of real creatures can be reproduced in 
machinery? What do such automata reveal about real creatures?
Vaucanson’s prime creation was a mechanical duck, which became 
the most talked-about bird in all of europe. Vaucanson became quite rich 
as a result of exhibiting the duck and his other automata. Indeed, Vaucan-
son was even elected to L’Academie des Sciences as an “associated Mechani-
cian”, a position that was created solely to honor him.
What was so special about Vaucanson’s mechanical duck? It had a 
weight-powered mechanism of over 1,000 movable parts that was hidden 
inside the bird and its pedestal. each wing had over 400 articulated pieces. 
and, the duck’s many and varied actions included: drinking, dabbling, 
gurgling, rising, crouching, stretching and bending its neck, and moving 
its wings, tail, and feathers. all of this was very well and good. but, the 
duck’s greatest claim to fame was that it ate grain and, after a suitable delay, 
it defecated. good show!
Vaucanson’s famous avian automaton is sometimes called: Le Ca-
nard Digérateur or The Digesting Duck. but, this moniker turns out to 
be a flagrant misnomer. The duck did not digest food at all —it was a 
fraud! The ingested food actually progressed no farther than the base of 
the duck’s neck. Fake excrement —that had earlier been loaded into a 
hidden repository near the duck’s tail— was expelled after a programmed 
postprandial delay. The debunker of the duck was none other than Jean 
eugène Robert-Houdin, another famous French mechanician and magi-
cian (Riskin, 2003a).
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today, instead of mechanical ducks imitating real ones, 
computerized creatures like aIbo —the dog-like robot manufactured by 
the Sony Corporation— are becoming increasingly lifelike. We may not 
be fooled by this most recent charade, but real dogs may have been tricked 
when they were allowed to interact with aIbo (Kubinyi, Miklósi, Kaplan, 
gácsi, topál & Csányi, 2004).
In a recent essay, Riskin (2003b) suggests that Vaucanson’s Duck 
has commanded so much attention for so long because it dramatizes two 
contradictory claims: (a) animals are merely machines. (b) animal life is 
irreducible to mechanism. because this tension persists, Riskin proposes 
that we still live in the age of Vaucanson. We are continuing a project that 
began 250 years ago by the Digesting Duck that didn’t.
beyond these philosophical issues, Vaucanson’s Duck poses a very 
practical problem for comparative psychology: How can we discriminate 
profound from superficial resemblance? after all, seeing is not always 
believing. large silvery predators swim in the depths of the sea; but, sharks 
are fish and dolphins are mammals. bats, budgerigars, and bees all fly; but, 
these animals are mammals, avians, and insects, respectively.
In fact, there is no sure and simple way to discriminate profound 
from superficial resemblance. but, a hint from William James suggests 
how we might be able to do so.
James
america’s first great psychologist, William James (1842-1910), 
long ago complained that “...it is the bane of psychology to suppose that 
where the results are similar, processes must be the same (1890, p. 528)”. 
James clearly took exception to glibly agreeing with Montaigne’s earlier 
adage that: From like results we must infer like faculties.
James underscored this interpretive problem by posing a 
hypothetical example: “Psychologists are too apt to reason as geometers 
would, if the latter were to say that the diameter of a circle is the same 
thing as its semi-circumference, because, forsooth, they terminate in the 
same two points” (1890, p. 528). This geometrical argument suggests 
a promising, practical solution to the problem of deciding whether the 
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same process underlies similar behaviors in different organisms —a prime 
challenge of comparative psychology.
Suppose that we systematically vary some independent variable 
across many —not just two— different parametric values and we observe 
the effects of those variations on the behavior of different species of 
animals. Now, suppose that those parametric functions closely parallel 
one another. Most researchers would agree that such striking “parametric 
parallels” would be extremely unlikely to have arisen by chance; instead, 
those parallels suggest a common process at work in the different species. 
Thus, parametric study is not just workmanlike psychological science; it is 
absolutely vital to comparative behavioral study.
Empirical research in comparative cognition
We now turn to four domains of contemporary psychological 
science in which clear parametric parallels have been documented in humans 
and animals, thereby suggesting the operation of common processes in 
associative/causal learning, short-term memory, number discrimination, 
and metacognition. I selected these particular realms because they are basic 
to adaptive behavior and because they remain extremely active areas of 
investigation in comparative cognition.
Associative/causal learning
Causation is fundamental to all natural science. Many researchers 
have come to believe that identifying and verifying the interrelations 
between natural phenomena requires logical or statistical inference. If that 
were the case, then these processes might very well be uniquely human. 
David Hume (1711-1776) vigorously disagreed with this point of view.
For Hume, a purely mechanical associative process leads to the 
impression of causation. Furthermore, the same process operates in humans 
and animals. Why did Hume come to these two striking conclusions? 
because, he said, survival cannot depend on the slowness and fallibility of 
logic and reason.
according to Hume, causal beliefs actually arise from the 
association of ideas. because they develop from the repeated conjunction 
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of events, associations must rise to their point of perfection by degrees. 
Thus, causal judgments should emerge progressively, as do associative learning 
curves. empirical evidence shows that they do (Wasserman, Kao, Van 
Hamme, Katagiri & young, 1996).
Furthermore, causal beliefs cannot produce assurance in any single 
event as the cause unless it is frequently paired with the effect and unless it 
is superior to rival causes. Therefore, as in the case of associative cue competi-
tion, discounting of inferior rivals should occur in causal judgment. Is that so?
Several famous cue competition effects have been shown to 
occur in associative learning: the two most familiar are: blocking and 
overshadowing (Wasserman & Miller, 1997). yet another famous case of 
cue competition is the cue validity effect that was first reported by Wagner, 
logan, Haberlandt, and Price (1968). Key to the cue validity effect is that 
Cue X, the target cue, is equally often paired with the outcome in all of the 
conditions. Cues a and b are differently paired with the outcome in the 
various conditions.
Wasserman (1974) showed how control by Cues a, b, and X 
systematically changes as a function of the disparity in the probability 
of the outcome after Cues a and b. Wasserman gave pigeons 2-key 
compound stimuli and separately measured pecking at each element. The 
aX and bX trials occurred equally often. The correlation of Cues a and b 
with food varied across five different experimental conditions; but, Cue X 
was equally paired with food in all five of the conditions. Responding to 
Cue a rose as it was increasingly paired with food; responding to Cue b 
fell as it was decreasingly paired with food. beyond these obvious effects, 
responding to Cue X fell as Cues a and b came to differentially predict the 
presentation and nonpresentation of food. In other words, despite Cue X 
having been paired with food 50% of the time in all of the conditions, the 
relative validity of Cues a and b dramatically affected responding to Cue 
X: the more valid were Cues a and b, the less valid was Cue X and the less 
responding it prompted.
Was this cue validity effect limited to rats, rabbits, and pigeons in 
operant and respondent conditioning situations? to find out, the possibility 
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of a cue validity effect in human causal judgment was analogously studied 
with an allergy diagnosis task by Wasserman (1990). College students 
had to rate the causal effectiveness of three possible allergens: shrimp, 
strawberries, and peanuts. The three allergens were given in two pairs: 
aX and bX, just as in the earlier conditioning experiments with animals. 
The association of these compounds with a hypothetical patient’s allergic 
reaction was varied across five different experimental conditions, just as in 
the prior pigeon project of Wasserman (1974).
The results were the same. Causal ratings of Cue a rose as it was 
increasingly paired with the allergic reaction. Causal ratings of Cue b fell 
as it was decreasingly paired with the allergic reaction. and, causal ratings 
of Cue X fell as Cues a and b came to differentially predict the occurrence 
and nonoccurrence of the allergic reaction.
Thus, causation and association are strongly related empirically. 
both exhibit acquisition. both exhibit cue competition. and, both phe-
nomena can be explained by elementary associative principles. Reason is 
not necessary to explain either phenomenon.
In Hume’s words, “any theory, by which we explain the operations 
of the understanding, or the origin and connection of the passions in 
man, will acquire additional authority, if we find, that the same theory is 
requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals (1777/1951, 
p. 104).” Such a theory does seem plausible. a good candidate is the 
Rescorla-Wagner (1972) theory, which instantiates Hume’s associative 
principles with an elegant mathematical model.
Short-term memory
Humans and animals alike can retain information for one-trial-
only use for several seconds, thereby exhibiting short-term memory. Fur-
thermore, when multiple items are to be retained, memory for those items 
often follows a characteristic function: initial items (primacy) and terminal 
items (recency) are better remembered than are items in the middle of the 
list. This familiar U-shaped function is called the serial-position effect.
Wright, Santiago, Sands, Kendrick, and Cook (1985) 
parametrically explored this serial-position effect in four different species: 
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humans, rhesus monkeys, capuchin monkeys, and pigeons. to all species, 
Wright et al. showed lists of four visual stimuli —one after another— on 
the upper of two viewing screens. Next, they showed a probe item on the 
lower viewing screen after fourth list item had been removed. If the probe 
item had been in the list, then one button response produced reward; if 
the probe item had not been in the list, then a second button response 
produced reward. any other button responses led to no reward being 
given.
all four species showed the serial-position effect. They did so at 
intermediate delays between the last list item and the two-button choice test. 
However, at short delays, all four species showed a continuously increasing 
memory function, with the last list item being the best remembered. and, 
at long delays, all four species showed a continuously decreasing memory 
function, with the first list item being the best remembered. These 
parametric parallels are truly remarkable and they strongly suggest that 
common memory processes are mediating all four species’ behavior in this 
list memory task.
It is worth noting that these patterns of behavior were exhibited 
by all four species despite disparities in the visual stimuli that were shown 
and the retention intervals that were given. For example, the longest 
retention interval was 10 s for pigeons, it was 30 s for rhesus and capuchin 
monkeys, and it was 100 s for humans. So, quantitative differences in 
memory capacity may well exist. yet, despite those quantitative differences, 
the nature of list memory may very well be the same.
Number discrimination
both humans and animals can discriminate the number of items 
that are shown at any given time, attesting to stimulus control by this 
abstract environmental property. How similar is the number discrimination 
process in different species?
Cantlon and brannon (2006) investigated this question in 
humans and rhesus monkeys. on each trial, two visual arrays containing 
different numbers (from 2 to 30) of small squares were shown. The task 
was to respond first to the array that contained fewer items. For monkeys, 
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the report response was touching the smaller array, thereby activating a 
touch screen with a finger. For humans, the report response was bringing a 
cursor into contact with the smaller array by operating a computer mouse. 
The investigators measured: choice accuracy and reaction time.
The results for monkeys and humans were strikingly similar. 
as the smaller and the larger numbers of items were made more similar 
to one another —thereby increasing the difficulty of the numerical 
discrimination— accuracy fell and reaction time rose. These findings 
suggest that monkeys and humans each represent numbers as large as 30 as 
perceptual magnitudes and that they rely on a comparison process which 
closely accords with Weber’s law. Cantlon and brannon suggest that 
the close parametric similarity in the behavior of monkeys and humans 
provides the strongest evidence to date of a single nonverbal, evolutionarily 
primitive mechanism for representing and comparing numerical values.
Metacognition
Since Descartes, philosophers have held that knowing one’s own 
mind is central to consciousness. Is metacognition uniquely human? Do 
animals also know if and what they know? How can you tell if they do?
Several groups of researchers have studied metacognition in such 
diverse animals as rats, pigeons, monkeys, and dolphins (see Carruthers, 
2008 for a review and critique). The earliest work with monkeys and 
humans was conducted by Shields, Smith, and Washburn (1997).
Monkey and human subjects were shown a visual display involving 
different densities of dots. If the display involved sparse dots, then subjects 
were to make one arbitrary report response to receive reward. If the display 
involved dense dots, then subjects were to make a second arbitrary report 
response to receive reward. The new twist to the experiment was that if 
subjects were uncertain as to which of the two responses to make, then 
they could make a third “uncertain” response, which provided a smaller, 
but more likely reward.
The pattern of results across a wide range of dot densities was very 
similar for monkeys and humans. as dot density rose, the probability of 
“sparse” reports fell and the probability of “dense” reports rose. Where the 
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two functions crossed, subjects were most likely to make the “uncertain” 
response, with the probability of such responses declining to either side of 
that point.
Considerable controversy surrounds these findings, particularly 
whether they uniquely support a metacognitive interpretation (Carruthers, 
2008; Smith, beran, Couchman & Coutinho, 2008). Nevertheless, one 
cannot help but be impressed by the close parametric parallels that hold 
here for monkey and human discrimination behavior.
Overview
My review of empirical research in comparative cognition 
discloses that clear parametric parallels exist between human and animal 
behavior. These parallels hold in such diverse realms as: associative/causal 
learning, short-term memory, number discrimination, and metacognition. 
These strong parametric parallels argue against superficial similarity and in 
favor of profound resemblance in the cognitive processes of humans and 
animals. Pursuit of further parallels surely seems warranted.
Observations and analyses
to organize my final observations and analyses, it will be useful to 
return to the three original questions from the 2003 New York Times that 
opened this paper.
How does the brain work?
Very well, indeed! brains remember past, they act in present, and 
they prepare for the future. These and other cognitive functions enable 
organisms to adapt to the complex and ever-changing contingencies of 
survival to which they are ceaselessly exposed. elucidating the biological 
mechanisms of cognition is the task of neuroscience.
Neuroscience has divulged that brains are not: hydraulic devices, 
telephone switchboards, or digital computers. Reducing brains to human-
made machines may have heuristic merit; but, 250 years of such efforts 
may have been far less fruitful than have direct studies of human and 
animal behavior and biology.
Humans, animals and computers: Minding machines?
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Neuroscience has also revealed that brains are not intelligently 
designed. In his recent book, The Accidental Mind, David linden (2007) 
persuasively argues that the human brain is a cobbled-together mess: a 
weird merger of ad hoc solutions that have accrued over millions of years of 
evolution. The brain’s quirky, inefficient, and sometimes bizarre organization 
nevertheless functions quite impressively given its haphazard provenance.
linden concludes that the brain is not an optimized, general 
problem-solving machine. It is clearly not the biological organ of reason 
—Descartes’ so-called “universal instrument”. our “accidental brain”, 
linden claims, accounts for the very nature of human nature.
Can robots become conscious?
opinion is certainly divided on this question. The prospect 
of conscious robots arises not only from science fiction, but from the 
philosophical notion of functionalism: the doctrine that what makes 
something a thought, a desire, or any other kind of mental state does not 
depend on its internal construction, but only on its function within the 
system of which it is a part. This notion permits other organisms or even 
machines with very different physical constitutions to have mental states if 
they too exhibit sufficiently similar behaviors.
So, can computers become conscious? I say “no”. Nor can they 
digest food or fall in love. as simulacra, robots and computers are just not 
made of the “right stuff.” Matter matters!
I have been challenged in my belief that computers cannot become 
conscious. Critics have contended that, if only we could properly mimic 
the organization of the nervous system —with silicon chips, plastic, or 
rubber bands— then consciousness would necessarily emerge.
I suspect that the very audacity of this claim makes it appealing to 
some. but, to me, it seems utterly preposterous. I know that philosophers have 
invented a number of clever thought experiments to support their functionalist 
position. I cannot claim to be half as clever as they are, but I have devised a 
simple thought experiment of my own. I call it the Martian mix.
Suppose that one of our future Mars probes drills down into the 
frozen Martian soil and gathers an interesting substance. The substance is 
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returned to earth where, at room temperature, it melts into a colorless, 
odorless liquid. The liquid freezes at 32 degrees F and it boils at 212 
degrees F. It is composed of two elements that are unknown on earth: call 
them X and y. The chemical formula for this liquid is found to be X2y. If 
I were offered this Martian mix to drink, then I would politely decline. to 
my functionalist friends, I would cheerfully say, “Salud!”
but, do not take my argument against computer consciousness as 
gospel. Consider as well these remarks of John Searle in a 2007 interview 
with the Boston Globe: “Defined by the manipulation of zeroes and ones, 
the computer model can tell us nothing about how our brains produce 
mind, consciousness, and a sense of self ”. at least I am in good company.
Are animals smarter than we think?
of course! It is no simple task to investigate animal cognition. 
but, as our methods have improved, so too have our understanding 
and appreciation of animal intelligence (Wasserman & Zentall, 2006b). 
Differences between humans and animals must exist: many are already 
known. but, they may be outnumbered by similarities.
I must thus conclude that humans and animals are highly related 
life forms which exhibit many complex cognitive processes. Parametric 
parallels suggest that common biological mechanisms lie at the root of 
their cognition and behavior. However, like Vaucanson’s Duck, computers 
and other mechanical devices are pale replicas built from the “wrong stuff”.
Nevertheless, pursuing Descartes’ agenda of objectively studying 
humans and animals as if they were machines does have real merit. Robust 
laws of behavior and cognition are emerging from such study. For a natural 
science of mind, I see no reasonable investigative alternative.
So, I conclude that minding machines do exist; they are humans 
and animals. Minding mediates the complex changes in behavior that 
humans and animals exhibit. Minding’s their business! Humans and 
animals are machines only insofar as their behaviors are products of 
biological mechanisms: we might call them “minding meat” or “meat 
machines” (Smith, 2005). as powerful as we may construct them, no 
artificial devices can ever duplicate nature’s own minding machines.
Humans, animals and computers: Minding machines?
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